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The Monetary Instrument Matters
William T. Gavin, Benjamin D. Keen, and Michael R. Pakko
This article explains the theory behind this
intuition by comparing and contrasting the proper-
ties of four monetary general equilibrium models.
The four models differ along two dimensions: the
monetary authority’s policy rule and the nature
of price adjustments. We examine two monetary
policy rules—an exogenous money growth rule
and an interest rate rule based on Taylor (1993)—
and two price adjustment mechanisms—flexible
prices found in a typical real business cycle (RBC)
model and sticky prices found in a typical New
Keynesian model. The closest work to this article
is Kim (2003), which looks at how the cyclical
nature of the real economy depends on the speci-
fication of the policy rule and the form of the
nominal frictions. The author concludes that get-
ting the policy rule right is at least as important
as getting the nominal frictions right. Our paper
emphasizes the behavior of money and prices,
but also reports results for real variables that are
consistent with Kim’s findings.
C
entral banks around the world have
long settled on the use of interest rates
as instruments to implement monetary
policy; but, until recently, there was
no sound theory supporting this choice. The
intuition for why interest rate rules dominate is
straightforward in a world with sticky prices and
interest-elastic money demand (see boxed insert).
When the demand for real money balances is
interest elastic, any shock that affects the path
for expected inflation or the real interest rate
causes money demand to shift. When the central
bank follows a money growth rule, this shift
causes the price level to jump. If price adjustment
is costly, this jumping can create real distortions.
When the central bank follows an interest rate
rule, on the other hand, the money stock is
endogenous and absorbs the adjustment. The
central bank can accommodate this jump in the
money stock almost instantaneously and with
little cost.
This paper revisits the debate over the money supply versus the interest rate as the instrument of
monetary policy. Using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework, the authors examine
the effects of alternative monetary policy rules on inflation persistence, the information content
of monetary data, and real variables. They show that inflation persistence and the variability of
inflation relative to money growth depend on whether the central bank follows a money growth
rule or an interest rate rule.  With a money growth rule, inflation is not persistent and the price
level is much more volatile than the money supply. Those counterfactual implications are elimi-
nated by the use of interest rate rules whether prices are sticky or not. A central bank’s use of
interest rate rules, however, obscures the information content of monetary aggregates and also
leads to subtle problems for econometricians trying to estimate money demand functions or to
identify shocks to the trend and cycle components of the money stock. 
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MONEY DEMAND AND INTEREST RATE RULES
The intuition for the difference between an interest rate and a monetary aggregate instrument
can be gleaned from the analysis of money demand in Friedman (1969). The demand for real money
balances is a function of a scale variable, such as income, and an opportunity cost variable, such





t). Panel A in the accompanying figure is based
on Figure 3 from Friedman’s illustration of the response of money demand and the price level fol-
lowing the central bank’s surprise decision to permanently raise the money growth trend (inflation)
from zero to a positive number—that is, 2 percent in Panel A. The money supply and the price
level are indexed to 100 and remain fixed before the policy change. With the 2 percent rise of
inflation, the nominal interest rate rises by 2 percent and the demand for money drops immediately.
Because the central bank has exogenously fixed the money growth rate, the price level must rise
to accommodate the fall in real balances. In an economy where the long-run expected inflation
trend is subject to shocks, the inflation rate is highly variable relative to the money growth rate. 
Panel B illustrates what happens if the central bank uses the interest rate as the monetary
policy instrument. In that case, the credible announcement of 2 percent inflation requires raising
the nominal interest rate target by 2 percent. The increase also leads to an immediate drop in the
demand for real money balances. With a nominal interest rate rule, however, the money supply
is endogenous and inflation is fixed by the policy rule. It is the money stock, rather than the price
level, that responds by shifting downward to clear the money market. Hence, in an economy with
stochastic inflation and an interest rate rule for monetary policy, the money growth rate is much
more variable than the inflation rate. That result is consistent with our observations from modern
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Figure B1
Monetary Policy Rules and a Change in the Inflation Target
*There is a shift from 0 to 2 percent in the inflation objective in period 50.Early dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
models that featured money as the policy instru-
ment also included flexible prices—and hence
implied small effects of monetary shocks on real
variables and unrealistically high price-level vari-
ability with low inflation persistence; examples
include Cooley and Hansen (1989, 1995), Lucas
(1990), Fuerst (1992), and Christiano and
Eichenbaum (1992).1 Later, models with sticky
prices came to dominate the literature; Cho and
Cooley (1995), Kimball (1995), King and Wolman
(1996), and Yun (1996) are representative of this
approach.2
Kimball (1995), for example, examined a
sticky-price model that assumed a constant veloc-
ity of money and an exogenous money supply
rule. This article demonstrates that two distinct
elements omitted from Kimball’s model are crucial
for understanding price dynamics. The first is an
interest-sensitive money demand function, and
the second is a monetary policy reaction function
based on an interest rate rule. King and Wolman
(1996) present a model with a shopping-time role
for money demand that is interest elastic, but most
of their analysis assumes that the central bank
either controls inflation directly or follows an
exogenous money growth rule. They include
only a very brief analysis of money growth rules
versus interest rate rules.
We extend the methodology of King and
Wolman (1996) to analyze more thoroughly the
important distinctions between flexible-price
and sticky-price models on the one hand and
between interest rate rules and money supply
rules on the other. Even though central banks do
not use money growth rules in practice, we com-
pare that regime to interest rate regimes because
much of our conventional wisdom about money
and monetary policy comes from analysis using
models with money growth rules. We also empha-
size a distinction between the steady-state inflation
rate and the inflation target. Historically, most
central banks have not had constant inflation
targets, but their targets evolve over time. Here
the expected inflation target converges to the
steady state in the long run, but it can deviate for
a considerable period. Consequently, we consider
two types of policy shocks: a highly persistent
inflation target shock and a relatively short-lived
liquidity shock.
THE MODEL
In this model framework, agents are infinitely
lived. Households get utility from consumption
and leisure but need to spend time shopping for
consumption goods; they can reduce the shopping
time for a given level of consumption by holding
higher money balances. The interest elasticity of
money demand is a key parameter for determining
the nature of inflation dynamics. Households
consume a composite good that is a combination
of outputs from monopolistically competitive
firms. Sticky prices are introduced using a Calvo
(1983) specification that allows for the possibility
of perfect price flexibility as a nested special case.3
Thus, it is straightforward to hold all other model
features constant when comparing sticky-price
and flexible-price specifications. Monetary policy
is conducted through lump-sum monetary trans-
fers that are determined by the central bank’s
monetary policy rule. Our focus is on the differ-
ences implied by policy rules that use the short-
term interest rate as an instrument versus those
that target money growth directly.
Households
Each period, households maximize the dis-
counted present value of the expected utility they
get from consumption and leisure:
(1)
where β is the household’s discount factor, ct is
the consumption bundle, and lt is leisure time.
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1 See Dittmar, Gavin, and Kydland (2005) and Dressler (2003) for
recent examples with flexible-price models with interest rate rules.
Ireland (2003) examines the role of policy in estimated versions
of both flexible- and sticky-price models.
2 See also influential papers by Ireland (1996), Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997), and McCallum and Nelson (1999). This basic
sticky-price model is developed rigorously by Woodford (2003,
Chap. 3).
3 The version with Calvo-style pricing and a money growth rule
was presented by Keen (2004).  Appendix A provides complete
details of our model specification and solution procedures.The momentary utility function is assumed to
take the form
where the values of the preference parameters σ1
and χ are positive. 
The household maximizes (1) subject to a
budget constraint
(2)  
where Pt is the nominal goods price; it is invest-
ment; kt is the capital stock, which evolves follow-
ing the capital accumulation process, kt+1 = it +
(1 – δ)kt, and depreciates at rate δ. Mt and Bt are
stocks of money and bonds, wt is the real wage
rate, qt is the real rental price of capital, and Rt–1
is the gross nominal interest rate on bonds pur-
chased at time t–1. The household also receives
monetary transfers, Tt, and distributed profits
from the goods-producing sector, Dt.
The household also faces a time constraint,
which specifies that total time (normalized to
unity) can be allocated to leisure, labor, and time
spent in transactions-related activities, st:
(3) .
The amount of time households spend shopping, st,
can be reduced by holding larger money balances
relative to nominal consumption expenditures:
(4) .
Money-demand elasticities are determined by the
curvature parameter, γ > 0, and ζ > 0 is a scale
parameter used to calibrate s.
As discussed by Lucas (2000), this type of
shopping-time specification implies a set of gen-
eral equilibrium relationships that resemble a
standard money-demand function. In particular,
after combining some of the first-order condi-
tions from the household’s utility maximization
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With the calibration γ = 1, this implies an interest
elasticity of –1/2. Note also that the real wage rate
and consumption spending enter this relationship
in such a way that their combined relationship
with real money balances is one-for-one; that is,
so long as productivity and consumption move
together (as they do on the steady-state path), the
scale elasticity of this money “demand” function
is unity.
Firms
The composite consumption good is a com-
bination of outputs, yj,t, produced in period t by
monopolistically competitive firms. Each firm’s
output comes from a production function,
(6)
where j indicates the number of periods since
the firm last adjusted its price, nj,t is the firm’s
demand for labor, kj,t is the firm’s demand for
capital, and Zt is an economywide productivity
factor. The productivity factor is assumed to follow
a stationary autoregressive process,
(7)     
where Z is the steady-state value of Zt and εZt is a
mean-zero, independently and identically distrib-
uted (i.i.d.) shock. Every period, each firm must
determine (i) the cost-minimizing combination
of nj,t and kj,t given its output level, the real wage
rate, wt, and the real rental rate of capital, qt; and
(ii) whether or not it can adjust its price. Sticky
prices are introduced using Calvo’s (1983) model
of random price adjustment. Specifically, the
probability that a firm can set a new price, Pt
*, is
η and the probability that a firm must keep the
price that it set j periods ago is (1 – η).
Each period, firms seek to minimize their
costs,
(8) ,
subject to the production function (6). Market-
wn qk tj t tj t ,, +
ln ln ln , Z ZZ tZt Z Z t () =+ − () () + − ρρ ε 1 1
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firm’s labor and capital demand must sum to the
economy aggregates, nt and kt. Our goal here is
merely to understand the workings of a simple
model, so we have omitted capital adjustment
and other frictions that are often included in this
type of model.
Cost minimization by households yields the
following demand equation facing each firm:
(9)
where –ε is the price elasticity of demand. Aggre-
gate output, yt, is given by
(10)
and the aggregate price level is a nonlinear com-
bination of current and past prices,
(11) .
Appendix A describes in more detail the impli-
cations of this pricing structure for the evolution
of the aggregate price level.
Policy Rules
Two classes of monetary policy regimes are
considered: a regime in which the central bank
follows an exogenous money growth rule and a
regime with a nominal interest rate rule in which
money growth is endogenous. Both policy rules
have two sources of disturbance: One is a shock
to the inflation target and the other is a shock to
the liquidity position.4 The shocks are identified
only by how long they persist. A shock to the liq-
uidity position is not expected to affect inflation
expectations except at very high frequencies.
Historical examples of extreme liquidity shocks
would be the Fed’s responses to the 1987 stock
market crash and the September 11th attacks. In







































































to be highly persistent, almost permanent. In our
model, we assume that the Fed has full credibility
and the inflation target is known.
In the United States today, the Fed does not
have an explicit inflation target such that the
public could distinguish perfectly between shocks
to liquidity and those to the inflation target. (In
extreme cases, this is not a problem; but it probably
matters for less-extreme cases.) For example, it
is not clear whether the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) and/or the public have been
able to make this distinction during periods of
countercyclical policy.5
The money growth rule is given as
(12)
where the hat over a variable indicates the percent
(or log) deviation from the steady state and µ ˆt
* is a
stochastic money growth target, µ ˆt
* = ρµµ ˆ*
t–1 + εµt,
where εµt is a mean-zero, i.i.d. shock to the nom-
inal growth trend. The second disturbance in (12),
υt, represents a transitory policy disturbance that
follows its own AR(1) process, υt = ρυυt–1 + ευt,
with a mean-zero, i.i.d. shock, ευt. Entering the
money-growth rule in first differences, the υ-shock
represents a transitory disturbance to the money
stock that leaves the long-run growth path
unchanged.
In the alternative regime, the central bank
operates with a Taylor-type interest rate rule that
is given by
(13)
where the inflation target follows a stochastic
AR(1) process, π ˆt
* = ρππ ˆ*
t–1 + επt, and the transi-
tory policy shock, ut, follows an AR(1) process,
ut = ρuut–1 + εut. Both error processes, επt and εut,
are mean-zero, i.i.d. shocks.
The inflation target shock in equation (13)
plays the same role as the money growth shock
in (12); both disturbances have a persistent effect
on the nominal growth path of the economy. That
is, the expected inflation target converges to the
steady state in the long run, but the actual target
may deviate for long periods. Thus, inflation in
period t has three components: the steady-state
ˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ , * Ry u tt tt y t t =+ − () ++ πθ ππ θ π
∆ ˆ ˆ , * Mt tt t =+− () − µυ υ 1
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5 See Goodfriend (1993) and Erceg and Levin (2003) for analysis of
the Fed’s credibility.
4 Both Ireland (2005) and Kozicki and Tinsley (2003) identify the
inflation target shock by assuming that this component has a unit
root.inflation rate, the stochastic component of the
inflation target (trend), and the transitory com-
ponent, which is due to other shocks. 
It is not clear how to define a common tran-
sitory policy shock or liquidity shock under the
alternative regimes. We define a transitory policy
shock to the money growth rule as a deviation of
the money stock that leaves the long-run growth
path unchanged. In the case of the interest rate
rule, we define a temporary liquidity shock in a
straightforward way—as a temporary shock to the
short-term interest rate. An expansionary liquidity
shock is a positive shock to money growth, υt, or
a negative shock to the nominal interest rate equa-
tion, ut. An inflation target shock, π ˆt
*, and a nomi-
nal interest rate shock, ut, have qualitatively
identical effects on the model’s dynamics. They
differ only by a scaling factor and, in our para-
meterization, by their persistence.6
CALIBRATION
To the extent possible, the parameters are
calibrated to generally accepted values for all the
experiments. Table 1 shows the baseline calibra-
tion used. In the utility function, the value of σ1
is set at 7/9. The steady-state labor share is 0.3
and shopping time is 1 percent of that value. That
calibration implies a labor supply elasticity of
real wages approximately equal to 3.7 The house-
hold discount factor is 0.99, so that the annual
real interest rate is 4 percent. The shopping-time
parameter, γ, is set to unity, implying an interest
rate elasticity of money demand equal to –0.5.
The capital share of output is set to 0.33, and the
capital stock is assumed to depreciate at 2.5 per-
cent per quarter. The price elasticity of demand
is set equal to 6, implying a steady-state markup
of 20 percent. We set the probability of price
adjustment equal to 1 for the flexible-price case
and equal to 0.25 for the sticky-price case. For the
sticky-price case, this implies that firms change
prices on average once per year. The model is
calibrated so that the steady-state inflation rate
is zero.8
The policy rule is calibrated to match Taylor’s
(1993) values. The coefficient on the deviation of
inflation from target is set at 0.5, and the response
of the interest rate—specified as a quarterly
return—to the output gap is 0.125. Shocks to the
nominal growth trend are assumed to be highly
persistent, ρµ = ρπ = 0.95, whereas the transitory
policy shocks have a lower value for their AR
parameter, ρυ = ρu = 0.3. The shocks to technology
are calibrated to be highly persistent, ρZ = 0.95.9
MONETARY POLICY SHOCKS
As described previously, two types of mone-
tary policy shocks are considered for each policy
rule: a shock to the nominal growth trend that
displays high persistence (near a random walk)
and a transitory policy shock with little persist-
ence. To gain insight about those shocks, we
consider their effects separately, comparing their
impact on the economy under flexible-price and
sticky-price specifications.
Shocks to the Nominal Growth Trend
Figure 1 illustrates the response of the econ-
omy to a persistent money growth shock in a
model where the central bank follows a money
growth rule. Panels in the left column display
the impulse responses produced by the flexible-
price model, and the panels in the right column
reflect the responses from the sticky-price model.
The top row shows what happens to the price
level and the money stock. In both models, the
price level jumps immediately after the shock.
While the money supply moves identically in
both models, the initial price level increase in
the sticky-price model is a bit more than half the
Gavin, Keen, Pakko
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8 This is necessary to prevent the nonadjusting firms’ prices from
becoming too far out of line with the flexible-price benchmark.
The same model dynamics result if there is positive steady-state
inflation and the nonadjusting firms can index prices to rise each
period by the steady-state inflation rate.
9 See Appendix A for details about the nonlinear model, the equi-
librium, the steady state, and the linear approximation around
the steady state that are used to calculate the model dynamics.
The solution method is based on King and Watson (1998, 2002).
6 The scaling is determined by the weight on deviations of inflation
from target.
7 The elasticity of labor supply with respect to the real wage equals
((1 – n – – h
–
)/n –)(1/σ1).14 percent rise in the flexible-price case. The
growth rates of money and prices in both models
eventually converge back to their steady-state
rates, but their levels remain permanently higher.
The second row of Figure 1 shows the impulse
responses of the inflation rate to the money growth
shock. The inflation spike in period 1 essentially
reflects the immediate rise in the price level after
the policy shock. In both cases, inflation is per-
sistent following a money growth shock, but the
persistence is masked by the surge in prices that
occurs contemporaneously with the shock.
The third row shows the responses of the
nominal and real interest rates to this shock.
Because that initial jump in the price level is
unanticipated, it does not affect nominal interest
rates. In the flexible-price model, the nominal
interest rate increases by about 0.3 percent, which
is approximately equal to the expected inflation
rate for period 2. The effect on the real rate is near
zero in the flexible-price model. With sticky
prices, the nominal interest rate rises about 0.75
percent above the steady state, reflecting the
higher expected inflation, which is associated
with the more gradual response in the price level
to the policy shock. The real rate declines for two
periods and then gradually returns to the steady
state as the effects of the shock dissipate. 
The bottom two panels in Figure 1 display
the responses of output and hours worked. The
higher inflation rate acts as a tax on real money
balances, which leads households to spend more
time shopping and less time working. With price
flexibility, hours worked falls about 0.1 percent
below the steady state. With sticky prices and an
exogenous money growth rule, neither money nor
prices are free to accommodate the jump in money
demand. Therefore, the adjustment occurs in real
variables. In our sticky-price model, the spike in
output is over 80 percent. Given that such a large
output response is highly counterfactual, sticky-
price models typically incorporate additional
Gavin, Keen, Pakko






Steady-state market labor share n 0.3
Household discount factor β 0.99
Shopping time γ 1
Capital share of output α 0.33
Depreciation rate δ 0.025
Price elasticity of demand ε 6
Probability of price adjustment η 0.25 → sticky prices





Technology shock ρz 0.95
Nominal growth shock ρπ = ρµ 0.95
Liquidity shock ρυ = ρu 0.3
Standard deviation
Technology shock σz 0.0075
Nominal growth shock σπ 0.004Gavin, Keen, Pakko
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Figure 1
Responses to a Persistent Money Growth Shock with a Money Growth Rule
NOTE: P, price level; M, money supply; R, nominal interest rate; r, real interest rate; Y, output; N, hours worked.frictions that limit the adjustment of capital and/or
labor after a monetary policy shock.10
Shifting our analysis to models with an interest
rate policy rule, Figure 2 shows how our models
respond to an inflation target shock when the Fed
is using the Taylor rule. The price level does not
jump after the inflation target shock. The higher
rate of inflation causes money demand to shift
down; but, with an interest rate rule, the money
stock declines in order to clear the money market.
The size of the fall in the money supply depends
on the interest elasticity of money demand. As
money demand becomes more interest elastic,
the size of the shift needed to clear the money
market gets larger. Price level, inflation rate, and
interest rate responses are very similar under both
the flexible- and sticky-price specifications. 
Output responses are much different under
the alternative price specifications. In the flexible-
price model, there are small negative effects on
output associated with the inflation tax on money
holdings. In the sticky-price case, output and
hours worked rise, but the effects are much more
reasonable than with a money supply rule.
Transitory Policy Shocks
Figure 3 shows the response of the economy
to a transitory money shock. The immediate
impact on the price level is smaller in the sticky-
price model than in the flexible-price model.
This is easiest to see in the second row of panels,
which show that the brief spike in inflation is
smaller in the sticky-price specification. In neither
of these cases, however, does inflation exhibit
any measurable persistence. In the third row, we
see that the effect on interest rates is small. In the
flexible-price case, all of the effect is on the nomi-
nal interest rate, which declines temporarily as
the price level returns to the original steady-state
path. In the sticky-price case, the real return falls
by less than in the flexible-price case because the
price level never strays far from its steady-state
path. Output and hours worked both rise, but the
size of the effect is an order of magnitude larger
with sticky prices. 
Note that, for the sticky-price case, we have a
pattern of dynamics that corresponds to the text-
book description of a liquidity effect. The decline
in the nominal interest rate is associated with a
corresponding reduction in the real interest rate
and a brief surge in output; the relatively large
response of output is due to the presence of fric-
tions restricting movement in both the price level
and the money supply. Again, the shift in money
demand requires large shifts in the real variables.
Figure 4 shows the effect of a transitory liquid-
ity shock when the central bank is using an inter-
est rate rule. In general equilibrium, a 1 percent
expansionary (negative) shock actually raises the
nominal interest rate by 25 basis points. In both
models, we see that the price level rises and the
money supply declines. The price increase is
large and permanent in the flexible-price model.
In the sticky-price case, where only a subset of
the firms can react to the shock, its transitory
nature causes a smaller adjustment and an even-
tual decline in the price level below the initial
equilibrium path. The third row of panels shows
the response of real and nominal interest rates.
The nominal rate rises by more in the flexible-
price model because the expected inflation rate
in periods 3 and beyond are larger. In the sticky-
price model, the real interest rate rises slightly.
The output effect is small and negative in the
flexible-price case. In the sticky-price model, a 1
percent shock to the short-term interest rate raises
output 5 percent on impact, but the effect dissi-
pates quickly. Note that this type of transitory
policy shock—which is standard in the literature
on interest rate rules—does not display a textbook
liquidity effect under either the sticky-price or
flexible-price specification.
Technology Shocks
The technology shock variable, zt, affects the
production function directly and therefore engen-
ders a direct effect on output regardless of the
nature of the policy rule or whether prices are
sticky or flexible. However, the nature of the
central bank’s policy rule affects the endogenous
responses of inputs to the production function—
Gavin, Keen, Pakko
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10 For example, by adding investment adjustment costs to this
sticky-price model, one can get reasonable-looking changes in
output and larger changes in the real interest rate.Gavin, Keen, Pakko
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Figure 2
Responses to an Inflation Objective Shock with an Interest Rate RuleGavin, Keen, Pakko
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Figure 3
Responses to a Transitory Policy Shock in a Money Growth RuleGavin, Keen, Pakko
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Figure 4
Responses to a Transitory Policy Shock in an Interest Rate Rulewhich, in turn, affects the overall response of
output. In this regard, the nature of the monetary
policy reaction function is quantitatively impor-
tant for the evolution of real variables only when
prices are assumed to be sticky.
The left column of Figure 5 shows the
response of the flexible-price, money growth rule
economy. This setting serves as a convenient base-
line for our comparison, because it most closely
approximates an RBC model in which there are
no monetary distortions at all. As is typical of
this type of shock, the temporary but persistent
increase in output that results from the direct effect
of the disturbance is enhanced by an increase in
the real wage rate and employment. Consequently,
the initial rise in output is about 50 percent larger
than the direct effect that the technology itself
would imply. The increase in factor productivity
also engenders an investment response that serves
as a propagation mechanism. 
However, as widely noted in the RBC litera-
ture, this mechanism is rather weak: If there were
no persistence in the technology shock, there
would be little persistence in output. Because
monetary policy does not respond in any way to
the shock under a money growth rule, the increase
in output implies that the price level falls below
trend; the ensuing anticipated disinflation requires
an upward adjustment to real money balances,
which takes place through a downward jump in
the price level. As we saw with shocks to the
inflation trend, the shifts in money demand are
accommodated by jumps in the price level. 
When prices are sticky and the central bank
implements a money growth rule, as shown in
the right column of Figure 5, the responses of
the model to a technology disturbance are dra-
matically different: The initial downward jump
in the price level is only half the size of the jump
with flexible prices. Inflation is not persistent in
either case. In both cases, the real rate responds
as predicted in the benchmark RBC model. The
responses of nominal rates are small, but in oppo-
site directions. The most dramatic effects occur
in output and hours worked, which decline
sharply in the sticky-price model.11 There is also
an initial decline in investment (not shown), such
that the endogenous propagation channel of
capital accumulation is even less quantitatively
important.
The key to understanding the responses of
this version of the model to productivity shocks
is in the nature of the Calvo pricing process: With
a majority of firms unable to lower prices in
response to the shock, relative demand for their
products drops off, moving the firms back along
their marginal cost curves. With higher costs and
lower final demand, firms dramatically scale
back their demand for factors of production until
after they have an opportunity to adjust prices.
When a larger proportion of firms is assumed to
change prices each period, with η = 1/2, for exam-
ple, the initial negative response of output and
work does not occur. After prices have adjusted
further—after four periods or more in the present
calibration—the model economy has adjusted to
a trajectory that resembles that of the flexible-
price specification.
The pattern of responses shown in the lower
right-hand panel of Figure 5 demonstrates the
limitations of a recent influential assertion by
Galí (1999). Using a long-run identifying assump-
tion in a vector autoregression model, Galí found
that a permanent shock to technology is associated
with an initial decline in work effort. From this
finding, he argues that sticky prices must play a
role in the propagation of technology shocks. 
But while our model predicts this type of
response when the central bank is following a
money growth rule, the response does not occur
when policy follows an interest rate rule. As
shown in Figure 6, the interest rate rule effectively
eliminates the difference between the sticky-price
and flexible-price models. The price response is
muted by the interest rate rule, compared with
the jump that is illustrated in Figure 5. Because
interest rate targeting smooths price changes,
the gap that develops between the firms that can
change prices and those that cannot remains small.
The model responses are nearly identical. In other
words, the use of an interest rate rule, by elimi-
nating large price-level swings, insulates the real
responses of the model from the sticky-price dis-
tortions that arise under a money growth rule.
Gavin, Keen, Pakko
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11 Dotsey (1999) shows that changes in interest rate smoothing can
have large real effects in a sticky-price model.Gavin, Keen, Pakko
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Responses to a Technology Shock with a Money Growth RuleGavin, Keen, Pakko
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Responses to a Technology Shock with an Interest Rate RuleTIME-SERIES PROPERTIES OF
MONEY AND PRICES
This section documents how the time-series
properties of money and inflation differ under
the alternative monetary policy regimes.12 There
is a large seasonal element in money but not in
prices or interest rates. Mankiw, Miron, and Weil
(1987) showed that a strong seasonal component
in U.S. interest rates disappeared after the creation
of the Federal Reserve in 1913. Barsky and Miron
(1989) showed that there are large seasonal com-
ponents in quantities but not in prices. Both these
empirical regularities are consistent with our
model of a central bank that uses an interest rate
procedure to implement monetary policy. 
We begin with a brief look at data for the G7
countries for the period from 1980:Q2 to 1998:Q4.
We use data on interest rates, consumer price
index (CPI) inflation, and M1 growth, which are
not seasonally adjusted.13 To calculate the relative
persistence in M1 growth and inflation, we calcu-
lated the largest root of each series using an aug-
mented Dickey-Fuller equation. The relative
volatility is measured by the standard error of
the regression. We included five lags of quarterly
data to account for the remaining serial correlation
and the predictable seasonal component. The
results are shown in the top panel of Table 2. The
first column reports the standard error of the equa-
tion for the augmented Dickey-Fuller regression
for CPI inflation. The second column reports the
largest root in the CPI regression. The third and
fourth columns report the results for M1. 
The standard error of the equation for M1 is
always larger than that for the CPI. On average it
is almost four times larger. For the G7 average,
the largest root in CPI inflation is 0.67 and the
largest root in M1 is 0.36. As the results show,
there is a large dispersion across countries in the
estimates of persistence of M1 growth.14
The bottom panel in Table 2 (Panel B)
reports results from our four alternative models
under the baseline calibration shown in Table 1.
Included are the standard deviations and the
first-order autoregressive coefficients for inflation
and money growth. We compute statistics for our
model economies subject to technology shocks
and persistent money growth shocks (with a
money growth rule) or persistent inflation target
shocks (with the Taylor rule). Those experiments
do not include the short-run liquidity shocks. The
first two rows of Panel B report the results for the
money growth rule and the next two rows report
the results for the Taylor rule. The policy rule
makes a much bigger difference than does the
degree of price flexibility. With a money growth
rule, the standard deviation of the inflation rate
is always greater than the standard deviation of
the money growth rate. The first-order autocorre-
lation for inflation is near zero. The first-order auto-
correlation coefficient for money growth reflects
(but is substantially smaller than) the persist-
ence in the shock to the money growth trend. 
The model generated data that more closely
resemble observed economic data when we use
an interest rate rule. Money growth is more vari-
able than inflation. Under both pricing regimes,
the first-order autocorrelation of inflation is near
0.7, but money growth exhibits no autocorrela-
tion.15
The last two rows in Panel B show that our
results do not depend on persistent shocks to the
nominal growth trend. When there are only tech-
nology shocks, inflation and money growth are
about half as volatile; but the relative variability
of money growth and inflation is approximately
14 If we use data on currency and reserves, we find that the money
growth rates are much more volatile than when we use M1. The
autocorrelation functions of currency and reserve aggregates are
dominated by negatively correlated seasonal components. For the
United States, seasonally adjusting the data adds persistence to the
time series for both money growth and inflation. The adjustment
reduces the variability of money growth, but not inflation.
15 Our models imply that univariate models will underestimate the
persistence of shocks to the money growth trend when using data
generated under interest rate regimes. For example, Cooley and
Hansen (1989, 1995) estimate the autocorrelation of monetary
shocks to be just 0.5. Using cross-section price and output data
and long-run monetary neutrality to achieve identification, Balke
and Wynne (2004) estimate that the permanent component in M2
growth is highly persistent—matching broad movements in inflation.
Gavin, Keen, Pakko
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12 See Dressler (2003) and Sustek (2004) for models that include
both inside and outside money and attempt to account for the
dynamic behavior of the monetary aggregates.
13 We used the International Financial Statistics measure of currency
outside banks for the United Kingdom. We did not include 1998
for the United Kingdom because of a large break in the series in
1998:Q2.unchanged. With interest rate rules, inflation
persistence can be driven by persistent shocks to
technology.
The high volatility of the money supply that
accompanies interest rate targeting obscures the
information content of monetary aggregates.
Cooley and LeRoy (1981) document problems
that econometricians have faced trying to estimate
money demand functions. One of the ironic
characteristics of the New Keynesian paradigm
is that the model embeds the quantity theory of
money as a long-run proposition, but money rarely
appears in the policy rule. McCallum (2001)
explores the reasons why money does not appear
in the policy rule and concludes with support for
the notion “that policy analysis in models with-
out money, based on interest rate policy rules, is
not fundamentally misguided.”
CONCLUSION
A comparison of flexible- and sticky-price
models with both money growth and interest rate
Gavin, Keen, Pakko
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Table 2
Statistical Properties of Nominal Variables (1980:Q2 to 1998:Q4)
A. Country results
CPI M1
SEE Largest root SEE Largest root
Canada 0.47 0.76 2.52 0.15
France 0.34 0.82 1.22 0.69
Germany 0.45 0.71 2.12 –0.33
Italy 0.41 0.91 1.67 0.54
Japan 0.50 0.43 1.37 0.44
United Kingdom 0.62 0.64 1.39 –0.68
United States 0.36 0.47 1.18 0.77
G7 average 0.45 0.68 1.64 0.36
B. Model results
CPI M1
SD AR(1) SD AR(1)
Money growth rule
Sticky prices 2.22 0.03 0.51 0.70
Flexible prices 4.36 –0.07 0.51 0.69
Taylor rule
Sticky prices 0.60 0.72 10.55 –0.06
Flexible prices 0.55 0.70 9.56 –0.08
Technology shocks only
Sticky prices 0.34 0.73 5.41 –0.04
Flexible prices 0.28 0.71 4.62 –0.07
NOTE: An augmented Dickey-Fuller equation with five lags of quarterly data was used to measure the largest root in M1 and CPI
growth rates. The standard error of the equation (SEE) was used to measure the volatility in these series. In other cases, we report the
standard deviation (SD) and first autocorrelation (AR(1)) in the growth rate series. The baseline calibration was used in the model
calculations.
SOURCE: CPI and M1 data come from the OECD Main Economic Indicators. For the United Kingdom, M1 was not available, so we
used currency outside banks ending in 1997:Q4. Exact sources and data definitions are listed in Appendix B.policy rules leads to the following conclusions.
First, interest rate rules rather than money growth
rules can capture the degree of inflation persist-
ence and the relative volatility of the price level
observed in the data. 
Second, with sticky prices the real effects of
transitory policy shocks differ under the different
policy rules. When the central bank uses a money
growth rule, the real effects are much too large to
be plausible in the sticky-price model unless
other frictions, such as investment adjustment
costs, are also included. But central banks do not
use money growth rules, so this counterfactual
implication does not seem important. It does,
however, suggest a reason why central banks
choose to implement monetary policy using an
interest rate instrument.
Third, and most importantly for model
builders, when shocks are highly persistent, the
distinction between monetary policy rules is more
important for price dynamics than is the choice
of the price-adjustment assumption. The reason
for this can be seen in how money demand
adjusts under an interest rate rule. In this case,
desired price changes are relatively smooth and
there is not much difference between flexible-
and sticky-price equililbria. A corollary of this
result is that the response of nominal variables
such as inflation and the money supply are very
similar in both flexible- and sticky-price models
when the central bank uses an interest rate rule.
An important implication of this result is that it
will be difficult to use information about firms’
actual pricing policies to distinguish between
macro theories.
Finally, a central bank’s use of interest rate
rules obscures the information content of mone-
tary aggregates and leads to subtle problems for
econometricians trying to estimate money demand
functions or to identify shocks to the trend and
cycle components of the money stock. Highly
persistent money shocks will be masked by the
high-frequency volatility associated with keeping
the interest rate relatively constant in the short
run. 
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APPENDIX A
TECHNICAL NOTES
This appendix provides detailed information on the sticky- and flexible-price models. It outlines
the relevant equations in the model, determines the steady state, and linearizes the model. Furthermore,
this appendix provides the necessary information to replicate the simulations of this paper, using the
solution methods outlined in King and Watson (1998, 2002).
The Equilibrium
These equations describe the equilibrium for the households’ problem. Households are infinitely
lived agents who seek to maximize their expected utility from consumption, ct, and leisure, lt,
subject to the following budget constraint, time constraint, and capital accumulation equation:
(A1)                          
(A2)
where Bt is government bonds, Pt is the price level, it is investment, Mt is the nominal money stock, wt is
the real wage rate, nt is labor, qt is the rental rate on capital, kt is the capital stock, Dt is the firms’ profits
remitted to the households, Rt is the gross nominal interest rate, Tt is a transfer from the monetary author-
ity, δ is the depreciation rate, and st represents the shopping-time costs of holding money balances,
(A3)
Utility maximization by the households yields the following first-order conditions for ct, lt, nt, Mt,
Bt, it, and kt:
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where λt, τ1,t, and τ2,t are the Lagrangian multipliers of the budget constraint, time constraint, and the
capital accumulation equation, respectively. By substituting (A5) into (A4), (A6), and (A7), the first-




By substituting (A9) into (A10), the first-order condition for kt+1 becomes 
(A14) .
The marginal utilities of ct and lt are
As a result, the households’ problem is described by equations (A1), (A2), (A3), (A8), (A11), (A12),
(A13), and (A14).
The next set of equations comes from the firms. The firms are monopolistically competitive producers
of output, yj,t, according to
(A15)
where j indicates the number of periods since the firm last adjusted its price, nj,t is firm labor demand,
kj,t is firm demand for capital, and Zt is an economywide productivity factor. This productivity factor
evolves in the following manner:
(A16)                                            
where Z is the steady-state value of Zt and εZ,t is a mean-zero, independently and identically distrib-
uted (i.i.d.) shock. Each period, every firm must make two decisions. First, firms determine the cost-
minimizing combination of kj,t and nj,t given their output level, the wage rate, and the rental rate of
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new price, Pt
*, is η and the probability a firm must charge the price that it last set j periods ago, P*
t–j, is
(1 – η).
Each period, firms seek to minimize their costs,
subject to (A15). This cost minimization implies the following two-factor demand equations:
(A17)
(A18)
where ψt is the Lagrangian multiplier from the production function and accordingly is interpretable
as the real marginal cost of output. The market-clearing conditions for capital, kt, and labor given the
conditional probability of price adjustment (η) are
(A19)                                           
Because the real wage and user cost of capital are economywide costs, the real marginal cost and capital
services/labor ratio will be the same for all firms (i.e., kj,t/nj,t = kt/nt).
The composition of output purchased by households is
(A20)                                                     
where
(A21)
Cost minimization by households yields the following product-demand equation:
(A22)
where Pt is a nonlinear price index such that
(A23)
Because the probability of price adjustment is constant, (A23) can be reduced to
(A24)                  
Furthermore, when (A19) is used to aggregate capital and labor over all firms, (A15) becomes
(A25)                                                yt
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t is shown by substituting
(A22) into (A25) to get
(A26)              
To eliminate the infinite number of lags of Pt
* in (A26), an auxiliary price index is defined as
(A27)                                                        
Given this price index, (A27) is substituted into (A26) to produce
(A28)
The fraction η of firms that are able to adjust its price seek to maximize the expected value of its profits:
(A29)                            
subject to (A15). Using the factor-demand equations, (A17) and (A18), the production function, (A15),
and the firm-demand equation, (A22), the firms’ maximization problem, (A29), is rewritten as
(A30)                                   
Maximizing (A30) with respect to Pt
* yields
Thus, the profit-maximizing price is
(A31)                                                                     
where
Furthermore, the evolution of VR,t and VC,t can be written in the following manner:
(A32)                                              and
(A33)                                             
Therefore, the firms’ problem is summarized by (A16), (A17), (A18), (A21), (A24), (A25), (A27), (A28),
(A31), (A32), and (A33).
The Steady State
These are the steady-state equations for the households. To begin, the steady-state equations for the
time constraint, (A1), the capital accumulation equation, (A2), and the shopping-time costs, (A3), are
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FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2005 655The steady-state first-order conditions for the households’ problem, (A8), (A11), (A12), (A13), and
(A14), are
Next are the steady-state equations for the firms. The first two equations are the steady states of the
factor-demand equations, (A17) and (A18):
Recall that kj,t/nj,t = kt/nt, so that kj/nj = k/n in the steady state. The steady-state aggregate production
function, (A25), is
The steady-state relationship between y and y – from (A28) is
where the steady-state value of P – from (A25) is
and where π is the steady-state inflation rate. The steady-state profit-maximizing price from (A31) is
where the steady-state values of VR and VC in (A32) and (A33) are
Finally, the steady-state identity equations for y and P from (A21) and (A24) are
Linearization Around the Steady State
This section linearizes the model around its steady state. A hat is used to signify percent deviation
from the steady state. Thus, n ˆt is the percent deviation of labor from its steady state.
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656 SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2005 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEWBeginning with households, the linearized equations for the time constraint, (A1), the capital
accumulation equation, (A2), and the shopping-time costs, (A3), are
The linearized first-order conditions for the households’ problem, (A8), (A11), (A12), (A13), and
(A14), are
Now, on the firm side, the linearized factor-demand equations for capital and labor, (A17) and (A18), are
The linearizations of (A25) and (A28) are as follows:
where the linearization of (A27) is
The linearized profit-maximizing price from (A31) is
where the linearized values of VR and VC in (A32) and (A33) are
The linearized versions of the identity equations for aggregate output and the price level, (A21) and
(A24), are




E tt t =
−
+− ()

































P PV ttt t Ct yE ++ + − 
 

  () 


 + ˆ ˆ . ˆ
, ψβη π ε 1 1
ˆ* ˆˆ , , , Pt VV Ct Rt =−


























  + ˆ , yt








++ − () − () =
++ −
1￿ a n d






































t sM l sM l t tt
=































/ ˆ ,Ä ˆˆ
++ =
=+ + () − ()
0
1 1 δ an nd
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ /. Pc s tt t t M + −− = () 10 γ
Gavin, Keen, Pakko
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2005 657The monetary authority’s policy instrument is either money or the nominal interest rate. When money
is the instrument, the linearized policy rule is
(A34)
where µt
* is the target money growth rate, which follows an AR(1) process, µ ˆt
* = ρµµ ˆ*
t–1 + εµt; and υt is a
transitory shock to the money growth rule, which also follows an AR(1) process, υt = ρuυt–1 + ευt. Both
error terms, εµt and ευt, are mean-zero, i.i.d. shocks.  
When the nominal interest rate is the instrument, the linearized policy rule is 
(A35)
where π ˆt = P ˆ
t – P ˆ
t–1; π ˆt
* is the target inflation rate, which follows an AR(1) process, π ˆt
* = ρππ ˆ*
t–1 + επt; and
ut is a shock to the interest rate rule, which also follows an AR(1) process, ut = ρuut–1 + εut. Both error
terms, επt and εut, are mean-zero, i.i.d. shocks.  
APPENDIX B
DATA
The data set contains quarterly time series for the G7 countries on the CPI and a narrow money
measure, usually M1. All the series are available from 1980:Q1 through 1998:Q4. We could not get M1
for the United Kingdom, so we used a measure of currency. For this series, we excluded the 1998 data
because there was a break in the series in the second quarter. All of the series are from the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Main Economic Indicators database or the
International Financial Statistics database. The data are not seasonally adjusted, and the quarterly figures
are computed as averages of monthly data. The data were retrieved in mid-October 2004 from the Haver
database, and Haver mnemonics are listed for each variable.  
Canada: money supply (M1) is c156fm1n@oecdmei; CPI inflation is c156czn@oecdmei.
France: money supply (M1) is c132fm1n@oecdmei; CPI inflation is c132czn@oecdmei.
Germany: money supply (M1) is c134fm1n@oecdmei; CPI inflation is c134czn@oecdmei.
Italy: money supply (M1) is c136fm1n@oecdmei; CPI inflation is c136czn@oecdmei.
Japan: money supply (M1) is c158fm1n@oecdmei; CPI inflation is c158czn@oecdmei.
United Kingdom: money supply (currency outside of banks) is c112mlc@ifs; CPI inflation is
c112czn@oecdmei.
United States: money supply (M1) is c111fm1n@oecdmei; CPI inflation is c111czn@oecdmei.
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ , * Ry ty t t t t t u = −+ + + () πθ ππ θ π
∆ ˆ ˆ , * Mt tt t = +− () − µ υυ 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ
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